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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, following the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks on the United States, was initiated in order to neutralize the
leadership of a global insurgency1 ideologically led by al Qaeda. Recently,
Senior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 60;
J.D. Candidate, American University Washington College of Law, May 2011. This Note is a
reduced version of a Comment originally selected for publication in this edition. The
Comment was mooted by Al Maqalah v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the case at
issue in this Note, because it reached the same conclusions about the habeas claims of
Bagram detainees as stated in the original Comment.
I wish to dedicate this piece to those who have provided the most support to me
during the writing process, namely Zuza, Peaches, Tigger, Pillow, Saliha, and Jerry
Seinfeld. Many thanks to Professor Daniel Marcus and Professor Stephen Vladeck for their
guidance, and to the law review staff for editing the piece.
1. See MICHAEL SCHEUER, IMPERIAL HUBRIS: WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE WAR ON
TERROR 60, 217 (2004) (explaining that insurgency better defines the war against al Qaeda
and its affiliates because a majority of these persons have military training, whereas a
minority have training in terrorist tactics). The term ―insurgency‖ or ―insurgents‖ will thus
be used throughout this Case Note instead of ―terrorism‖ or ―terrorists‖ because this term
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a number of violent encounters have occurred along the ungoverned border
between Afghanistan and Pakistan as a result of the escalating conflict
between U.S. soldiers, Taliban, and al Qaeda forces. Such military
engagement inevitably results in a number of complex challenges for the
U.S.; one of these challenges is the handling of captured enemies, and the
appropriate role of U.S. courts in resolving these issues. While the
Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush2 afforded constitutional habeas
corpus rights to detainees, questions remained as to the applicability of this
case to other U.S.-run detention centers, such as the one in Bagram,
Afghanistan. A recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Al Maqaleh v. Gates,3 concluded that Bagram
detainees were not entitled to habeas corpus protection, but left two major
questions unanswered: (1) what effect does the global nature of the
insurgency have on habeas jurisprudence,4 and (2) what is the appropriate
process due to combatants in wartime?5
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, the
Bush administration began detaining noncitizen combatants at Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba, leading to several court challenges by detainees and
culminating in the Supreme Court granting constitutional habeas corpus
protection to these detainees in Boumediene. In deciding that the
Guantánamo detainees were entitled to constitutional habeas corpus rights
even though they were captured overseas,6 the Court looked to Johnson v.
Eisentrager7 for guidance, deriving the following factors from that
opinion:8 ―(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy
better defines the nature and severity of the threat.
2. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
3. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
4. See id. at 98 (limiting the discussion to the fact that Bagram was clearly in an active
theater of war).
5. The circuit court explained that the detainees received inadequate process under the
Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board, but did not extend the discussion to what would
constitute adequate process. See id. at 96.
6. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739 (―In deciding the constitutional questions now
presented we must determine whether petitioners are barred from seeking the writ or
invoking the protections of the Suspension Clause either because of their status, i.e.,
petitioners‘ designation by the Executive Branch as enemy combatants, or their physical
location, i.e., their presence at Guantánamo Bay.‖).
7. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
8. See id. at 778–79 (holding that German combatants captured in China during World
War II were not entitled to habeas corpus protection, noting that ―the scenes of [the
detainees‘] offense, their capture, [and] their trial and [. . .] punishment‖ were all outside of
sovereign U.S. territory and jurisdiction and that the impracticality of affording ―alien
enemies‖ Suspension Clause protection during hostilities ―would hamper the war effort and
bring aid and comfort to the enemy‖).
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of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the
nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and
(3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner‘s entitlement to
the writ.‖9 In applying these factors, the Court in Boumediene concluded
that the process afforded Guantánamo detainees was insufficient,10 that the
United States intended to govern Guantánamo Bay indefinitely,11 and that
no practical obstacles stood in the way of granting detainees habeas
protection.12 The Court did note that its analysis might be different if the
detention facility were located within an ―active theater of war.‖13 One
question remaining after Boumediene was how this reasoning would apply
to enemy combatants detained outside the United States, but not at
Guantánamo Bay.
Prior to the Boumediene decision, the United States began using Bagram
Air Base as a detention center for newly-captured detainees, even
transferring insurgents captured outside of Afghanistan to Bagram, where
there are now over 750 prisoners, of whom thirty are non-Afghans.14 In Al
Maqaleh v. Gates, four Bagram detainees sought habeas corpus protection
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, a challenge both the
Bush administration and the Obama administration opposed.15 The district
court granted habeas corpus rights to some of the detainees at Bagram
under Boumediene‘s functional test.16 The district court claimed that the
site of apprehension factor weighed in favor of granting habeas protection
to the detainees because they had been captured outside of Afghanistan and
9. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
10. See id. at 767 (deciding that the first factor weighed in favor of granting the
detainees Suspension Clause protection because the government provided insufficient
process). The Court also explained that the Eisentrager prisoners received far more process
than the Guantánamo detainees, as they were tried by a military commission for violations
of the laws of war. Id.
11. See id. at 768 (contrasting Guantánamo Bay with Landsberg Prison, a post-World
War II prison that the United States did not intend to govern indefinitely).
12. See id. at 769 (concluding that the ―[g]overnment present[ed] no credible arguments
that the military mission at Guantánamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had
jurisdiction to hear the detainees‘ claims,‖ which, when viewed ―in light of the plenary
control the United States asserts over the base, none [were] apparent to [the Court either]‖).
13. See id. at 770 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring
in result)) (recognizing that the argument that issuing a writ would be ―‗impracticable‘ or
‗anomalous‘‖ would carry more weight were the detention facility in an ―active theater of
war‖).
14. Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New Facility for Afghan Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
16, 2009, at A8; Alissa J. Rubin & Sangar Rahimi, In Shift, U.S. Military Names 645
Detainees Held at Key Afghanistan Base, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at A6.
15. Charlie Savage, Embracing Bush Argument, Obama Upholds a Policy on Detainees
in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at A6.
16. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 231–32 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605
F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (granting the non-Afghan detainees habeas corpus protection but
not the Afghan detainee because of potential tension with the Afghanistan government).
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transferred to Bagram thereby avoiding constitutional issues.17 The court
noted that this apparent ―limitless Executive power‖ to avoid judicial
review of Executive detention decisions raised separation of powers
concerns, reasoning that
[i]t is one thing to detain those captured on the surrounding battlefield at
a place like Bagram, which . . . is in a theater of war. It is quite another
thing to apprehend people in foreign countries—far from any Afghan
battlefield—and then bring them to a theater of war, where the
Constitution arguably may not reach.18

The district court also examined the site of detention factor,19 concluding
that Bagram is substantially similar, although not identical, to Guantánamo
and that the United States exercises practical control over the detention
center.20 The court also concluded that the adequacy of process provided to
Bagram detainees weighed heavily in favor of extending the protections of
the Suspension Clause, even more than it did in Boumediene.21 Regarding
practical obstacles in granting the writ to Bagram detainees, the court
determined that producing detainees for habeas hearings would not be
difficult, as modern day technology such as video conferencing could be
used,22 and any burden created by such a process would be on lawyers and
administrative personnel, not U.S. soldiers on the battlefield.23
In considering this ruling on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia had to determine whether the district court
appropriately applied Boumediene‘s three-factor test. Concluding that the
district court did not, the D.C. Circuit relied on factors two and three of the
Boumediene analysis.24 Regarding the second, the court contrasted
Guantánamo Bay with Bagram, noting that the United States has exercised
17. See id. at 220 (emphasizing that the Guantánamo detainees had all been captured
elsewhere and brought to Guantánamo Bay ―with which they had no previous connection,‖
just like the four detainees before the court who were transferred to Bagram from other
countries).
18. Id. (internal quotation and brackets omitted) (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765).
19. Id. at 215.
20. See id. at 221–26 (finding that the site of detention factor, while not supporting the
Bagram detainees to the ―same extent‖ as it did the Guantánamo detainees, nevertheless still
shows that ―the United States has a high objective degree of control at Bagram‖).
21. See id. at 227 (citing the fact that the government conceded that the process for
Bagram detainees was ―less comprehensive‖ than the CSRT process).
22. See id. at 228 (commenting that modern methods of communication are routinely
used in Guantánamo habeas proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, which means that the government does not have to physically transfer the
detainees to the United States).
23. See id. at 228–29 (dismissing the government‘s concern that it would have to ―pull[]
potential witnesses from the battlefield‖ to testify in habeas proceedings because ―all four
petitioners in these cases claim to have been captured outside Afghanistan, far removed
from any battlefield‖).
24. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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de facto sovereignty over Guantánamo Bay for over 100 years, whereas in
Bagram the United States has shown ―no indication of any intent to occupy
the base with permanence.‖25 As to the third factor, the court immediately
noted that Afghanistan ―remains a theater of war,‖26 stating that it was
undisputed that Bagram Air Base is ―exposed to the vagaries of war,‖ thus
rendering it impractical to grant detainees habeas protection.27 Even
though the D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court that the process
afforded the Bagram detainees was less than that afforded to the
Guantánamo detainees, this factor did not outweigh the second and third
factors,28 which weighed strongly in favor of declining to extend habeas
protection to the Bagram detainees.29
II. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
A. A War Without Borders
Based on the three factor test enunciated by Boumediene, the
D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh properly concluded that constitutional habeas
corpus rights do not extend to Bagram detainees. Yet, the D.C. Circuit did
not go far enough. Because Boumediene‘s analysis considers whether the
detention facility is located in an active theater of war,30 we are left with
the question as to the scope of that theater. This analysis shows that the
war against al Qaeda and the insurgency is global in nature, logically
extending the theater of war to any country with an insurgent presence.
This means that a detainee captured outside of a particular theater of war,
such as Afghanistan, has still been captured in some theater.
The D.C. Circuit did not take into consideration this global dynamic.
The court understood that there was no evidence in this case that the
Executive intentionally sought to avoid the reach of the constitution by
transferring the detainees to an active theater of war, especially considering
that the Executive could not have ―anticipate[d] the complex litigation
25. Id. at 97.
26. See id. (―[T]he position of the United States is even stronger in this case than it was
in Eisentrager‖ because active hostilities had come to an end in Germany when the German
nationals were captured and convicted in China and detained in Landsberg Prison in
Germany).
27. Id.
28. See id. at 96–97 (stating that even though the detainees made a strong case
regarding the insufficiency of the process afforded to them, this did not end the habeas
analysis under Boumediene).
29. Id. at 98.
30. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 (2008) (citing Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in result)) (acknowledging that a detention
facility located in an active theater of war would affect its analysis because ―arguments that
issuing the writ would be ‗impracticable or anomalous‘ would have more weight‖).
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history . . . and predict the Boumediene decision long before it came
down.‖31 However, the court noted that Boumediene did not claim that its
three factors were exhaustive; instead, the D.C. Circuit noted that future
litigants might be successful arguing that the Executive intentionally sought
―to evade judicial review of . . . detention decisions by transferring
detainees into active conflict zones, thereby granting the Executive the
power to switch the Constitution on or off at will.‖32
Such an opening for future detainees contesting their detention in federal
court demonstrates a poor understanding of the Obama administration‘s
ineptly phrased ―overseas contingency operations.‖33
Notably, the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) presumes the global
nature of this war by broadly defining potential targets as ―nations,
organizations, or persons‖ and defines the purpose as ―prevent[ing future]
acts of international terrorism.‖34
Prior to September 11, 2001, al Qaeda employed a hierarchical structure
in Afghanistan, similar to how a military operates,35 but still maintained
significant global ties.36 During the 1990‘s, al Qaeda had an annual budget
of $30 million and had trained 10,000 to 20,000 fighters. 37 Since the U.S.led war against al Qaeda and the Taliban, al Qaeda has shifted its
organizational structure to adapt to a changing environment.38 As with any
insurgent organization, its top priority is to avoid complete destruction by a
31. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 98–99.
32. Id. at 98 (quoting Joint Brief for Petitioners-Appellees at 34, Al Maqaleh,
605 F.3d 84 (Nos. 09-5265, 09-5266, 09-5277)).
33. Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, “Global War On Terror” Is Given New Name, WASH.
POST, Mar. 25, 2009.
34. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(emphasis added).
35. See JOHN ROBB, BRAVE NEW WAR: THE NEXT STAGE OF TERRORISM AND THE END
OF GLOBALIZATION 140 (2007) (explaining that al Qaeda operated along hierarchical lines in
Afghanistan and maintained a dispersed network elsewhere).
36. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 55–56 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
Bin Laden envisioned himself ―as head of an international jihad confederation,‖ and
deservedly so because he had formed an ―Islamic Army Shura‖ that coordinated the
activities of terrorist organizations spread throughout the world. See id. at 58 (finding that
these organizations were located in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Iraq, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea, and noting that Bin
Laden also had links, albeit ―less formal,‖ with terrorist groups in Chad, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria, Uganda, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Bosnia).
37. MICHAEL SCHEUER, IMPERIAL HUBRIS: WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE WAR ON
TERROR 60 (2004); Eben Kaplan, The Rise of al-Qaedaism, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (2007), http://www.cfr.org/publication/11033/rise_of_alqaedism.html (last
updated July 18, 2007).
38. See ROBB, supra note 35, at 140 (observing that once the U.S. completed the
invasion of Afghanistan and assassinated ―key individuals,‖ al Qaeda ―fragment[ed]‖ due to
the ―limits on group size‖ associated with concentrating large groups of people in one
discernible location).
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single attack or military campaign.39 As such, al Qaeda has created ―small
units with good administrative capabilities‖ that ―will spare [them] big
losses,‖ in contrast to ―[l]arge military units [that] occupy large areas which
are difficult to conceal from air reconnaissance and air attack.‖40 These
networks of small units are not run by Osama bin Laden or any of his top
associates, making it more difficult to disrupt the network by killing al
Qaeda‘s top leaders.41
Globalization has empowered these networks of ―global guerrillas,‖ as
―[t]hey are wired, educated, and globally mobile.‖42 Moreover, ―[t]hey
build complex supply chains, benefit from global money flows, travel
globally, innovate with technology, and attack shrewdly.‖43 These groups
employ open-source warfare, where individuals join based on the promise
that teamwork will generate ―amazing results.‖44 This promise unites the
entire community, and does not mean that the individual members or
groups share the same motivations.45 Most importantly, these small units
can still have devastating effects, as the September 11th attacks
demonstrate.46
This structure has allowed al Qaeda to retain its influence in many of the
countries in which it had a presence prior to September 11th.47 It has also
39. SCHEUER, supra note 1, at 60.
40. See id. at 60–61 (quoting Sayf al-Adil, al Qaeda‘s chief of military operations).
41. See ROBB, supra note 35, at 139 (arguing that assassinating ―a single operational
leader will not work,‖ just as killing the leader of the 9/11 attacks, Mohamed Atta, would
not have disrupted the four-team network with one pilot each, as each group could function
independently of Atta).
42. Id. at 146; see ROBERT M. CASSIDY, COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE GLOBAL WAR
ON TERROR: MILITARY CULTURE AND IRREGULAR WAR vii (2006) (cautioning that al Qaeda
has ―harnessed the advantages of globalization‖ to ―undermine the Western system of
states‖).
43. ROBB, supra note 35, at 146; see SCHEUER, supra note 1, at 219–20 (discussing how
the internet facilitates al Qaeda‘s advancement by allowing individuals throughout the world
to receive online training without traveling to an insurgent training camp).
44. See ROBB, supra note 35, at 116 (stating that the promise of remarkable results is
the ―central connection‖ that binds all members of the network); see also
MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 135 (2004) (arguing that terrorist
networks acquire new members not through ―common notions of recruitment and
brainwashing,‖ but instead through social bonds).
45. See ROBB, supra note 35, at 116 (listing potential motivations such as ―patriotism,
hatred of occupation, ethnic bigotry, religious fervor, [or] tribal loyalty,‖ but claiming that
these do not necessarily matter so long as they all agree that they can achieve significant
results).
46. See id. at 139 (citing the terrorist cells responsible for 9/11 as examples of how
―[s]trategic attacks are possible with a network of less than seventy people‖). Most
importantly, the operational style of the terrorist cell responsible for 9/11 served as a
precursor to al Qaeda‘s decentralized structure today, where the members of the cell ―used a
sparse operational network,‖ had a leadership structure ―despite a lack of formal hierarchy,‖
and were run by ―relative unknowns‖ where the removal of a ―single operational leader‖
would not have disrupted the network. Id. at 137–39.
47. See SCHEUER, supra note 1, at 71 (noting that al Qaeda‘s reach still extends to
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been able to launch a series of attacks or attempts since September 11th,
including the London train bombings, the train bombings in Madrid, a
series of attacks in Saudi Arabia, multiple attacks in Iraq and Pakistan, and
the recent Christmas Day attempted bombing of a commercial airplane
flying into the United States.48 These global guerrillas have the capability
to cause major infrastructure disruptions through targeted attacks on oil
production and transportation as well as attacks on the U.S. power grid, to
name a few.49
While al Qaeda does not concentrate its forces in one location like a
military, its members nevertheless have military training. Therefore the
term ―insurgent‖ better defines the al Qaeda member than ―terrorist,‖ as al
Qaeda‘s training camps primarily ―provide quality and uniform religious
and paramilitary—or insurgent—training to young Muslims.‖50 These
camps have trained thousands of insurgents, who then travel home to ―fight
and train others—not swarms of terrorists.‖51 While al Qaeda does train
terrorists in these camps, they are more accurately described as ―al Qaeda‘s
urban warfare arm, or special forces.‖52 Thus, the insurgents who have
made their way through al Qaeda‘s training camps have familiarity with
various combat skills and weapons, and thus pose a threat to the United
States and its overseas interests.53 Even more troubling is the fact that new
―Somalia, Kenya, and the East Coast of Africa; the Pacific countries of Indonesia, Malaysia,
and the Philippines; Chechnya, Kashmir, and the new Central Asian states; the countries of
Western Europe; and Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Canada‖).
48. See, e.g., U.S. Dep‘t of State, Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961–2003: A Brief
Chronology, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_chron.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2010)
(Pakistan); Al-Qaeda group claims bomb plot, BBC NEWS (Dec. 28, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/8433151.stm
(attempted Christmas Day bombing); Timeline: Al-Qaeda, BBC NEWS (Sept. 4, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/in_depth/3618762.stm
(Saudi Arabia, London, Madrid).
49. See ROBB, supra note 35, at 94–110 (describing potential vulnerabilities by
explaining how the interconnectedness of the global economy and infrastructure systems
allows for insurgents to target only a few aspects of a network but achieve near total system
collapse). For instance, if insurgents targeted the U.S. power grid, they could ―shut down 60
percent of the grid with the removal of only 2 percent of the high-load nodes.‖ Id. at 105.
Some
experts
believe
that
another
attack
on
U.S. soil is inevitable and would likely be bigger than September 11th. See STEPHEN
FLYNN, THE EDGE OF DISASTER: REBUILDING A RESILIENT NATION 36, 96 (2007).
50. See SCHEUER, supra note 1, at 217 (noting that these camps have taught insurgents
―a deep skill set over a narrow range,‖ producing insurgents instead of terrorists); CASSIDY,
supra note 42, at 11 (stating that the United States has ―limited‖ its definition of the enemy
by mischaracterizing the war as one solely against terrorism as opposed to an insurgency).
51. See SCHEUER supra note 1, at 217 (describing how the camp-system operated in
Afghanistan, but also noting that such camps existed in Sudan, Yemen, the Phillipines,
Chechnya, and Saudi Arabia, each of which primarily trained insurgents, not terrorists).
52. See id. (criticizing the United States‘ fixation on a ―small number of terrorists‖ and
―camps producing assassins and suicide bombers,‖ instead of addressing the key issue: the
several thousand insurgents with combat-training produced from these camps).
53. See id. (listing the various combat skills al Qaeda insurgents have learned, such as
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recruits can receive online training without having to travel to a training
camp.54
This analysis indicates that the insurgency has global roots and global
capabilities to launch attacks in a variety of countries. It shows that
defining an active combat zone as one where traditional military operations
take place ignores the manner in which the current enemy operates.
Because the insurgency stretches beyond the borders of any one country,
the theater of war logically extends to not only Afghanistan where al Qaeda
still operates, but to any locale in which al Qaeda and its affiliates recruit
operatives, plan operations, carry out attacks, or evade capture.
Consequently, the separation of powers concerns that motivated the
Boumediene court, namely transferring detainees from one particular region
of an active war to a place outside that theater as a means to avoid judicial
review, does not have the same application to Bagram or other similarly
situated detention facilities. Furthermore, this conclusion renders irrelevant
the argument that the Executive has intentionally transferred combatants to
an active conflict zone. Unlike the D.C. Circuit, courts considering this
issue in the future should recognize that traditional notions of warfare no
longer apply and take into account the fact that Boumediene only concerned
the issue of combatants captured on the battlefield and transferred off the
battlefield to Guantánamo Bay, far away from any hostilities. In striking
contrast, the detainees involved in Al Maqaleh were captured on the global
battlefield and transferred to another theater of the same war.55
While some may counter that this argument is inconsistent with
Boumediene because the Guantánamo detainees had also been captured in
an active theater of war, such an argument ignores the fact that
Guantánamo Bay is not in an active theater of war by the accepted
definition or by the definition proposed herein. Bagram is clearly in an
active theater of war, and based on this analysis, detainees captured outside
how to use ―AK-47s, Stinger missiles, GPS systems, advanced land navigation, RPGs, map
reading, demolition techniques, celestial navigation, hand-to-hand combat techniques,
trench digging, weapons deployment, escape and evasion techniques, first aid, scientific
calculations to plot artillery fire, first aid, [and] secure communications‖).
54. See id. at 219–20 (discussing how any individual with internet access can receive
jihadist training, thus increasing the pool of potential recruits).
55. Regarding the four detainees involved in Al Maqaleh, each was either a national of
or captured in a country with an al Qaeda presence, which further supports the argument that
Bagram detainees have been transferred from one theater of the war to another theater of the
same
war.
See
Al
Maqaleh
v.
Gates,
604
F. Supp. 2d 208, 209 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the four Bagram detainees before the court
were captured in the United Arab Emirates, Thailand, Pakistan, and outside Afghanistan
respectively, and were originally from Yemen, Afghanistan, and Tunisia), rev’d, 605 F.3d
84 (D.C. Cir. 2010); THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 36, at 58 (noting that al
Qaeda has a presence in multiple countries, including Thailand, Pakistan, and Afghanistan).
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of Afghanistan have still been captured in part of a theater of war.
Moreover, to claim that this argument is inconsistent with Boumediene
ignores the fact that Boumediene emphasized the unique characteristics of
Guantánamo Bay, effectively limiting the extension of this doctrine to other
detention facilities.56
To be true to Boumediene, we also must consider the impracticalities
created by courts ignoring the global dynamic of the insurgency.
As has been well-documented, Guantánamo Bay is closed to new
detainees.57 But the war against this global insurgency did not end when
President Obama took office; rather, in some respects it intensified.58 A
real need therefore exists to house newly-captured detainees. If courts
involved in future litigation find reason to believe that the Executive has
intentionally transferred insurgents to active war zones to avoid the reach
of the constitution and consequently grants habeas corpus protection to the
insurgents, then the United States faces at least two options, each of which
creates significant impracticalities. One option is to find a location within
the country of capture to detain insurgents, likely leading to the transfer of
the insurgent to the custody of that country‘s government. Such a step may
increase the likelihood that the insurgent will be tortured59 or may make it
easier
for
the
insurgent
to
escape
from
custody.60
A second option involves confining insurgents in secretly-run U.S.
detention centers in various locations around the world.61 However, this
56. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 763–65 (2008) (discussing how
Guantánamo Bay is considerably different than post-World War II Landsberg Prison in
Germany).
57. Ernesto Hernández-López, Boumediene v. Bush and Guantánamo, Cuba: Does the
“Empire Strike Back”?, 62 SMU L. REV. 117, 124 (2009).
58. See, e.g., Greg Miller & Julian E. Barnes, Drone Plan Opens New War Front,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, at A1 (discussing the expansion of the CIA Predator drone
strikes in Pakistan).
59. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 997–98 (9th Cir.
2009) (describing how the plaintiffs were either captured by the United States and then
transferred to the custody of other governments and allegedly tortured, or captured by
countries other than the United States and allegedly tortured before being transferred to U.S.
custody), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing
Torture, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 106, 108–09, 115, 123 (discussing how
the United States captured combatants and allegedly transferred them to countries where
they were tortured, including Uzbekistan, Bosnia, Egypt, and Syria).
60. See, e.g., Main Suspects in USS Cole Bombing Escape from Yemeni Prison,
FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 11, 2003),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,83890,00.html (stating that ten of the major suspects
in the USS Cole bombing escaped from a Yemeni prison on April 11, 2003, including the
primary suspect).
61. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
2005, at A1 (reporting that the CIA ran secret detention centers throughout the world in the
aftermath of September 11th). With the coming of the Obama administration, it was
generally assumed that secret CIA detention centers would be closed, which, according to
most accounts, is the case. Joshua Partlow & Julie Tate, 2 Afghans Allege Abuse at U.S.
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could lead to less support from U.S. allies62 and increase insurgent
recruitment,63 thus negatively affecting the war effort.64 Each option
presents choices with consequences that proponents of granting habeas
protection to detainees would generally consider abhorrent.
B. Dis-incentivizing Judicial Intervention
This analysis does not support the proposition that Bagram detainees, or
any other detainees captured and detained by U.S. forces overseas, should
be detained indefinitely without adequate procedural protection. The
Boumediene Court concluded that the process received by Guantánamo
detainees was an inadequate habeas substitute,65 and the D.C. Circuit
correctly concluded that the process afforded Bagram detainees was less
than that of the Guantánamo detainees, but the D.C. Circuit did not define
―adequate process.‖66 Reports indicate that Bagram detainees have faced
harsh treatment and poor living conditions that are ―in many ways rougher
and . . . bleak[er] than its counterpart in Cuba.‖67 Yet, in late 2009, Bagram
detainees moved into a new facility that will eventually be operated and
controlled by the Afghan government.68
Along with this new facility, the United States recently implemented
enhanced procedural protections for the Bagram detainees, including the
creation of detainee review boards that allow detainees to contest their
detention within sixty days of imprisonment and every six months
Site, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2009, at A1. However, recent reports indicate that U.S. Special
Forces are running such a facility in Afghanistan, away from Bagram Air Base, where
recent reports of detainee abuse surfaced. Id.
62. TASK FORCE ON U.S. STANDING IN WORLD AFFAIRS, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE
ASSOCIATION, U.S. STANDING IN THE WORLD: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND THE FUTURE, 10
(2009), available at
https://apsanet.org/media/PDFs/APSAUSStandingShortFinal.pdf.
63. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security
(May 21, 2009), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD200900388.pdf (arguing that both Guantánamo Bay and allegations of torture have helped al
Qaeda‘s recruiting efforts).
64. See, e.g., id. (stating that Guantánamo Bay and allegations of torture have
undermined the war on terrorism).
65. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 767, 790–92 (2008) (discussing the
deficient procedural protections available to Guantánamo detainees, ultimately holding that
these were an inadequate habeas substitute).
66. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
67. See Tim Golden & Eric Schmitt, A Growing Afghan Prison Rivals Bleak
Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at A1 (―Men are held by the dozen in large wire
cages, the detainees and military sources said, sleeping on the floor on foam mats and, until
about a year ago, often using plastic buckets for latrines. Before recent renovations, they
rarely saw daylight except for brief visits to a small exercise yard.‖).
68. See Kim Gamel, Afghans Agree on Handover Plan for U.S. – Run Prison, AP, Jan.
9, 2010 (noting that the Afghan government said that it would immediately commence
training exercises for approximately 800 Afghan soldiers to prepare them for running the
detention facility).
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thereafter.69 These review boards seek to determine whether the detainees
provided ―substantial support‖ to the Taliban, al Qaeda, or related forces
engaging in hostilities against coalition forces, representing a change from
the previous standard of ―support.‖70 The review board itself consists of
three U.S. officers advised by a military attorney.71 Bagram detainees are
individually assigned a ―personal representative‖ to ―advocate on [their]
behalf,‖ explain to the detainees the review process in place,72 and gather
evidence,73 but these representatives are not lawyers.74 Detainees are
notified of the review board‘s decision in writing within one week, and will
be released ―as soon as practicable‖ if they do not meet the criteria.‖75
While these changes are significant, the next step should be improving
the status determination process so as to remove the primary rationale for
judicial interference in Executive detention decisions; namely, the
indefinite detention of alleged combatants without sufficient process. In
commenting on the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) process at
Guantánamo Bay, the Court cited the constraints placed upon detainees to
contest the factual basis of their detention, noting that detainees have
―limited means to find or present evidence to challenge the Government‘s
case against [them, do] not have the assistance of counsel[,] and may not be
aware of the critical allegations that the Government relied upon to order
[their] detention.‖76
An enhanced process should give the detainees the right to challenge
their detention while also affording the U.S. government the ability to use
69. Gerry J. Gilmore, Bagram Detention Facility to Implement Case Review Panels,
U.S. DEP‘T OF DEFENSE (Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=55831
(last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
70. SAHR MUHAMMEDALLY, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, FIXING BAGRAM: STRENGTHENING
DETENTION REFORMS TO ALIGN WITH U.S. STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 4 (2009), available at
www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/Fixing-Bagram-110409.pdf.
71. See Rubin supra note 14 (contrasting the review board‘s new duties with those of
the past, which involved reviewing a detainee‘s case only once, followed by renewal
detention orders based purely on a ―paper record‖).
72. Alissa J. Rubin, U.S. Readies New Facility For Afghan Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2009, at A8.
73. MUHAMMEDALLY, supra note 70, at 5.
74. See Rubin, supra note 14 (noting that human rights advocates claim that these new
procedures will leave detainees with ―little more recourse‖ than they have already).
75. MUHAMMEDALLY, supra note 14, at 6; see Rubin, supra note 71 (reporting that
release rates rose ―drastically‖ in Iraq after similar procedures were put in place); Ron
Synovitz, New U.S. Plan Reportedly to Let Afghan Prisoners Challenge Incarceration,
RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Sept. 14, 2009),
http://www.rferl.org/content/New_US_Plan_Reportedly_To_Let_Afghan_Prisoners_Challe
nge_Incarceration/1822216.html (concluding that this process resembles the process used in
Iraq, where officials determine which detainees pose the most significant threat and which
can be rehabilitated and released back into society).
76. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783–84 (2008).
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evidence in a manner that would not compromise national security. This
could be done by creating procedures that allow the government to use
classified evidence much in the same way that the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA) enables the government to use classified evidence
in civilian courts.77 This would also give detainees the right to review the
evidence used to justify their detention, provided that this evidence is
presented in a manner that would not compromise national security.78
Classified information and sources could also be protected by placing a
rebuttable presumption in favor of the government‘s evidence,79 as well as
admitting hearsay evidence as the most reliable evidence when necessary.80
As for procedural protections, each detainee should be entitled to an
attorney, possibly a military lawyer (as opposed to personal
representatives), who can present exculpatory witnesses and evidence.81
Also, the review panels should be replaced with a neutral magistrate, such
as a military judge, who would have the authority to release detainees if the
evidence favors such a decision.82 These attorneys, however, should not
77. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16 (2006).
78. See, e.g., id. (providing procedures for the use of classified evidence in civilian
trials); United States v. Lee, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1325 (D.N.M. 2000) (explaining that
CIPA ―provides for pretrial procedures to resolve questions of admissibility of classified
information in advance of its use in open court‖). CIPA defines classified information as
―‗information and material‘ subject to classification or otherwise requiring protection from
public disclosure,‖ meaning that ―CIPA applies to classified testimony as well as to
classified documents.‖ See Lee, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 1325 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 1
(2006)); Sarah Lorr, Comment, Reconciling Classified Evidence and a Petitioner’s Right to
a “Meaningful Review” at Guantánamo Bay: A Legislative Solution, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2669, 2673 (2009) (arguing that a ―CIPA-like statute‖ should be passed by Congress to deal
with classified evidence issues in Guantánamo habeas proceedings so that detainees can
have a meaningful review of their detention).
79. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533–34 (2004) (holding that a U.S.
citizen deemed an enemy-combatant is entitled to due process protections, but noting that
―the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that . . . enemy-combatant proceedings . .
. be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of
ongoing military conflict‖ by placing a ―presumption in favor of the government‘s evidence,
so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were
provided‖).
80. See, e.g. id. (stating that hearsay evidence could be admissible in enemy combatant
proceedings for a U.S. citizen as a further means to deal with national security concerns);
BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA BENHALIM, GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT
BROOKINGS, THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS
LAWMAKING
35
(2010),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.aspx (discussing
the different forms of hearsay evidence used in habeas hearings for Guantánamo detainees,
including intelligence reports summarizing information from a variety of sources, records
produced from interrogating detainees, and summaries of statements made by detainees
during CSRT hearings).
81. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 14 (reporting that the U.S. government released the
names of the detainees held at Bagram, but noting that human rights advocates believed that
while this was an important step, it did not go far enough because ―[l]awyers need more
than detainees‘ names to find their families and see if they want legal representation‖).
82. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (concluding that a U.S. citizen held in the United
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have access to the detainees until the United States has had reasonable time
to interrogate them for useful information that could prevent future attacks
against U.S. forces and civilians. Yet, the grounds for continued detention
should be independent of any information gathered during interrogation.
Finally, because the magistrate‘s factual findings and status determination
will not be free from error even with these procedures in place, there
should also be a periodical review process conducted by a military judge
who can hear new evidence that may exonerate a detainee and order release
when circumstances permit such an outcome.83
Implementing these procedural protections would enhance national
security by promoting the rule of law in Afghanistan while ensuring that
dangerous detainees remain imprisoned.
CONCLUSION
While the D.C. Circuit took an important step in not extending habeas
corpus protection to Bagram detainees, they left unanswered two crucial
questions. Because the court did not acknowledge how the global nature of
the insurgency affects the habeas analysis, future litigation may turn on
whether there is evidence that the Executive transferred combatants to an
active war zone to avoid the reach of the Constitution. Moreover, even
though the court did not comment on the appropriate procedural protections
due to detainees, the Executive should still be mindful that further judicial
intervention could undermine war efforts.

States as an enemy combatant must ―be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the
factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker‖); Rubin, supra note 14
(stating that the new review procedures will lead to a quicker release of erroneously held
detainees at Bagram).
83. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 786 (2008).

